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Abstract
Multi-agent complex systems comprising populations of decision-making particles, have wide
application across the biological, informational and social sciences. We uncover a formal analogy
between these systems’ time-averaged dynamics and conventional many-body theory in Physics.
Their behavior is dominated by the formation of ‘Crowd-Anticrowd’ quasiparticles. For the specific
example of the Minority Game, our formalism yields analytic expressions which are in excellent
agreement with numerical simulations.
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Multi-agent simulations are currently being used to study the dynamical behavior within a
wide variety of Complex Systems [1]. Within these simulations, N decision-making particles
or agents (e.g. commuters, traders, computer programs, cancer/normal cells, guerillas [2, 3,
4]) repeatedly compete with each other for some limited global resource (e.g. road space,
best buy/sell price, processing time, nutrients and physical space, political power) using
sets of rules which may differ between agents and may change in time. The population
is therefore competitive, heterogeneous and adaptive. A simple minimal model which has
generated more than one hundred papers since 1998, is the Minority Game (MG) of Challet
and Zhang [2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10]. Numerical simulations can yield fascinating results –
however it is very hard to develop a general yet analytic theory of such multi-agent systems.
Given that a multi-agent population is a many-body interacting system with the addi-
tional complication of the particles being decision-making, one wonders whether it might be
possible to develop a generalized ‘many-body’ theory of such systems. This is a daunting
task since the success of conventional many-body theory relies on the fundamental physical
particles having a relatively simple internal configuration space (e.g. spin) which is identical
for each particle – moreover, the particle-particle interactions are time-independent [11]. By
contrast, each decision-making particle lives in a complex configuration space represented
by the information it receives and the particular strategies which it happens to possess. In
addition, the agent-agent interactions generally evolve in time and depend on prior history.
However, it is precisely these difficulties which make this problem so interesting to a theo-
retical physicist. In addition to the important real-world applications listed above, such a
generalized many-body theory could be applied to physical systems where internal degrees
of freedom can be created artificially. An interesting technological example concerns an
array of interacting or interconnected nanostructures, where each nanostructure has its own
active defects which respond to the collective actions of the others [12].
Here we propose a general many-body-like formalism for these complex N -body systems.
Inspired by conventional many-body theory [11], it is based around the accurate description
of the correlations between groups of agents. We show that the system’s fluctuations will
in general be dominated by the formation of crowds, and in particular the anti-correlation
between a given crowd and its mirror-image (i.e. ‘anticrowd’). The formalism, when applied
to the MG, yields a set of analytic results which are in excellent agreement with the numerical
findings of Savit et al. (see Fig. 1) [6]. We note that there have been many other MG theories
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proposed to date [5], yet none of these has provided an analytic description of the Savit-curve
[6] over the entire parameter space. In what follows, we do not restrict ourselves to the MG
– for example, our formalism can be easily generalized to multiple options [10]. We hope
that our results stimulate many-body physicists to investigate transferring their techniques
to these more general systems and real-world applications.
Consider N agents (e.g. commuters) who repeatedly decide between two actions at each
timestep t (e.g. +1/ − 1 ≡ take route A/B) using their individual S strategies. Our
formalism will apply to a wide variety of multi-agent games since it is reasonably insensitive
to the game’s rules concerning strategy-choice, rewards, and the definition of the winning
group. The agents have access to a common information source µ(t) which they use to
decide actions. This information may be global or local, correct or wrong, internally or
externally generated. Each strategy, labelled R, comprises a particular action for each
µ(t) ∈ {µ(t)}, and the set of possible strategies constitutes a strategy space Θ ≡ {R}. The
strategy allocation among agents can be described in terms of a rank-S tensor Ψ [9] where
each entry gives the number of agents holding a particular combination of S strategies. We
assume Ψ to be constant over the timescale for which time-averages are taken. A single Ψ
‘macrostate’ corresponds to many possible ‘microstates’ describing the specific partitions of
strategies among the N agents [9]. To allow for large strategy spaces and large sets of global
information, we consider {R} and µ(t) to be numbers on the line from R = 1→ Rmax, and
from µ = 1→ µmax respectively. For small strategy spaces, the subsequent integrals can be
converted to sums. Denoting the number of agents choosing −1 (+1) as N−1(t) (N+1(t)),
the excess number choosing +1 over −1 represents the inefficiency of the system and is given
by D(t) = N+1(t)−N−1(t). In the context of financial markets, D(t) would be proportional
to the price-change representing the excess of demand over supply. Similar analysis can be
carried out for any function of D(t), N+1(t) and/or N−1(t), and time-cumulative value of
these quantities. Here we focus on D(t) which is given exactly by:
D(t) ≡
∫ Rmax
R=1
dR a
µ(t)
R n
S(t);Ψ
R , (1)
where S(t) is the current score-vector denoting the past performance of each strategy [9].
The combination of S(t), Ψ and the game rule (e.g. use strategy with best or second-best
performance to date) will define the number of agents n
S(t);Ψ
R using strategy R at time t.
The action a
µ(t)
R = ±1 is determined uniquely by µ(t).
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In conventional many-body Physics, we are either interested in the dynamical properties
of D(t), such as the equation-of-motion, or its statistical properties [11]. Here we focus on
these statistical properties: (i) the moments of the probability distribution function (PDF)
of D(t) (e.g. mean, variance, kurtosis) and (ii) the correlation functions that are products
of D(t) at various different times t1 = t, t2 = t + τ , t3 = t + τ
′ etc. (e.g. autocorrelation).
Numerical multi-agent simulations typically average over time t and then over configurations
{Ψ}. A general expression to generate all such functions, is therefore
D
(τ,τ ′,τ ′′,...)
P ≡ 〈〈D(t1)D(t2) . . . D(tP )〉t〉Ψ (2)
=
〈〈∫
. . .
∫ Rmax
{Ri}
dR1 dR2 . . . dRP a
µ(t1)
R1
a
µ(t2)
R2
. . . a
µ(tP )
RP
n
S(t1);Ψ
R1
n
S(t2);Ψ
R2
. . . n
S(tP );Ψ
RP
〉
t
〉
Ψ
≡
∫
. . .
∫ Rmax
{Ri}
dR1 dR2 . . . dRP
〈〈
V (P )(R1, R2, . . . , RP ; t1, t2, . . . , tP )n
S(t1);Ψ
R1
n
S(t2);Ψ
R2
. . . n
S(tP );Ψ
RP
〉
t
〉
Ψ
where
V (P )(R1, R2 . . . , RP ; t1, t2 . . . , tP ) ≡ a
µ(t1)
R1
a
µ(t2)
R2
. . . a
µ(tP )
RP
(3)
resembles a time-dependent, non-translationally invariant, p-body interaction potential in
R ≡ (R1, R2 . . . , RP )-space, between p charge-densities {n
S(ti);Ψ
Ri
} of like-minded agents.
Note that each charge-density n
S(ti);Ψ
Ri
now possesses internal degrees of freedom determined
by S(t) and Ψ. Since {n
S(ti);Ψ
Ri
} are determined by the game’s rules, Eq. (2) can be applied
to any multi-agent game, not just MG. We focus here on moments of the PDF of D(t)
where {ti} ≡ t and hence {τ} = 0. Discussion of temporal correlation functions such as
the autocorrelation D
(τ)
2 will be reported elsewhere. We consider explicitly the variance D2
to demonstrate the approach, noting that higher-order moments such as D4 (i.e. kurtosis)
which classify the non-Gaussianity of the PDF, can be treated in a similar way. The potential
V (P ) is insensitive to the configuration-average over {Ψ}, hence the mean is given by [13]:
D1 =
∫ Rmax
R=1
dR
〈
V (1)(R; t)
〈
n
S(t);Ψ
R
〉
Ψ
〉
t
. (4)
If the game’s output is unbiased, the averages yield D1 = 0. This condition is not necessary
– one can simply subtract D21 from the right hand side of the expression for D2 below –
however we will take D1 = 0 for clarity. The variance D2 measures the fluctuations of D(t)
about its average value:
D2 =
∫ ∫ Rmax
R,R′=1
dRdR′
〈
V (2)(R,R′; t)
〈
n
S(t);Ψ
R n
S(t);Ψ
R′
〉
Ψ
〉
t
(5)
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where V (2)(R,R′; t) ≡ a
µ(t)
R a
µ(t)
R′ acts like a time-dependent, non-translationally invariant,
two-body interaction potential in (R,R′)-space. Figure 2 illustrates a diagrammatic repre-
sentation of DP=1,2 in analogy with conventional many-body theory.
The effective charge-densities and potential will fluctuate in time. It is reasonable to
assume that the charge densities fluctuate around some mean value, hence n
S(t);Ψ
R n
S(t);Ψ
R′ =
nRnR′ + ε
S(t);Ψ
RR′ (t) with mean nRnR′ plus a fluctuating term ε
S(t);Ψ
RR′ (t). This is a good approx-
imation if we take R to be a popularity-ranking (i.e. the Rth most popular strategy) or a
strategy-performance ranking (i.e. the Rth best-performing strategy) since in these cases
n
S(t);Ψ
R will be reasonably constant. For example, taking R as a popularity-ranking implies
n
S(t);Ψ
R=1 ≥ n
S(t);Ψ
R=2 ≥ n
S(t);Ψ
R=3 ≥ . . ., thereby constraining the magnitude of the fluctuations in
the charge-density n
S(t);Ψ
R . Hence
D2 =
∫ ∫ Rmax
R,R′=1
dRdR′
〈
V (2)(R,R′; t)
〈
nRnR′ + ε
S(t);Ψ
RR′ (t)
〉
Ψ
〉
t
. (6)
We will assume that ε
S(t);Ψ
RR′ (t) averages out to zero. In the presence of network connections
between agents, there can be strong correlations between these noise terms ε
S(t);Ψ
RR′ (t) and
the time-dependence of V (2)(R,R′; t), implying that the averaging over t should be carried
out step-by-step as in Ref. [14]. For MG-like games without connections, the agents cannot
suddenly access larger numbers of strategies and hence these correlations can be ignored.
This gives
D2 =
∫ ∫ Rmax
R,R′=1
dRdR′
〈
V (2)(R,R′; t)
〉
t
nRnR′ . (7)
As in conventional many-body theory, the expectation value in Eq. (7) can be ‘contracted’
down by making use of the equal-time correlations between {a
µ(t)
R }. As is known for MG-
like games [5, 8, 10], the complete strategy space will contain strategies which have exactly
the same responses except for a few µ(t)’s. This quasi-redundancy can be removed by
focusing on a reduced strategy space such that any pair R and R′ are either (i) correlated,
i.e. a
µ(t)
R = a
µ(t)
R′ for all (or nearly all) µ(t); (ii) anti-correlated, i.e. a
µ(t)
R = −a
µ(t)
R′ for all
(or nearly all) µ(t); (iii) uncorrelated, i.e. a
µ(t)
R = a
µ(t)
R′ for half (or nearly half) of {µ(t)}
while a
µ(t)
R = −a
µ(t)
R′ for the other half of {µ(t)}. Hence one can choose two subsets of Θ,
i.e. Θ = U ⊕ U , such that the strategies within U are uncorrelated, the strategies within U
are uncorrelated, the anticorrelated strategy of R ∈ U appears in U , and the anticorrelated
strategy of R ∈ U appears in U . We can therefore break up the integrals in Eq. (7) into three
parts: (i) R′ ∼ R (i.e. correlated) hence 1
µmax
∫ µmax
µ=1 dµa
µ
Ra
µ
R′ = 1 and
〈
V (2)(R,R′; t)
〉
t
= 1.
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(ii) R′ ∼ R (i.e. anticorrelated) which yields 1
µmax
∫ µmax
µ=1 dµa
µ
Ra
µ
R′ = −1. If all possible global
information values {µ} are visited reasonably equally over a long time-period, this implies〈
V (2)(R,R′; t)
〉
t
= −1. For the MG, for example, {µ} corresponds to the m-bit histories
which indeed are visited equally for small m. For large m, they are not visited equally for a
given Ψ, but are when averaged over all Ψ. If, by contrast, we happened to be considering
some general non-MG game where the µ’s occur with unequal probabilities ρµ, even after
averaging over all Ψ, one can simply redefine the strategy subsets U and U to yield a
generalized scalar product, i.e. 1
µmax
∫ µmax
µ=1 dµa
µ
Ra
µ
R′ ρµ = −1 (or 0 in case (iii)). (iii) R
′ ⊥ R
(i.e. uncorrelated) which yields 1
µmax
∫ µmax
µ=1 dµa
µ
Ra
µ
R′ = 0 and hence
〈
V (2)(R,R′; t)
〉
t
= 0.
Hence
D2 =
∫ ∫ Rmax
R,R′=1
dRdR′
〈
V (2)(R,R′; t)
〉
t
nRnR′ =
∫ Rmax
R=1
dR (nRnR − nRnR)
=
∫
R∈U
dR (nRnR − nRnR + nRnR − nRnR)
=
∫
R∈U
dR (nR − nR)
2 . (8)
Equation (8) must be evaluated together with the condition which guarantees that the total
number of agents N is conserved:
N =
∫ Rmax
R=1
dR nR ≡
∫
R∈U
dR (nR + nR) . (9)
Equation (8) has a simple interpretation. Since nR and nR have opposite sign, they act like
two charge-densities of opposite charge which tend to cancel: nR represents a Crowd of like-
minded people, while nR corresponds to a like-minded Anticrowd who do exactly the opposite
of the Crowd. We have effectively renormalized the charge-densities n
S(t);Ψ
R and n
S(t);Ψ
R′ and
their time- and position-dependent two-body interaction V (2)(R,R′; t) ≡ a
µ(t)
R a
µ(t)
R′ , to give
two identical Crowd-Anticrowd ‘quasiparticles’ of charge-density (nR − nR) which interact
via a time-independent and position-independent interaction term V
(2)
eff ≡ 1. This is shown
schematically in Fig. 2. The different types of Crowd-Anticrowd quasiparticle in Eq. (8) do
not interact with each other, i.e. (nR − nR) does not interact with (nR′ − nR′) if R 6= R
′.
Interestingly, this situation could not arise in a conventional physical system containing just
two types of charge (i.e. positive and negative).
A given numerical simulation will employ a given strategy-allocation matrix (i.e. a given
rank-S tensor) Ψ. As Rmax increases from 1→∞, Ψ tends to become increasingly disordered
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(i.e. increasingly non-uniform) [4, 9] since the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean
number of agents holding a particular set of S strategies is equal to [(RSmax− 1)/N ]
1
2 . There
are two regimes: (i) A ‘high-density’ regime where Rmax ≪ N . Here the charge-densities
{nR} tend to be large, non-zero values which monotonically decrease with increasing R.
Hence the set {nR} acts like a smooth function n(R) ≡ {nR}. (ii) A ‘low-density’ regime
where Rmax ≫ N . Here Ψ becomes sparse with each element ΨR,R′,R′′,... reduced to 0 or
1. The {nR} should therefore be written as 1’s or 0’s in order to retain the discrete nature
of the agents, and yet also satisfy Eq. (9) [4]. Depending on the particular type of game,
moving between regimes may or may not produce an observable feature. In the MG, for
example, D1 does not show an observable feature as Rmax increases – however D2 does [6].
We leave aside the discussion as to whether this constitutes a true phase-transition [5, 9]
and instead discuss the explicit analytic expressions for D2 which result from Eq. (8). It
is easy to show that the mean number of agents using the Xth most popular strategy (i.e.
after averaging over Ψ) is [4]:
nX = N
[ (
1−
(X − 1)
Rmax
)S
−
(
1−
X
Rmax
)S ]
. (10)
The increasing non-uniformity in Ψ as Rmax increases, means that the popularity-ranking
of R becomes increasingly independent of the popularity-ranking of R. Using Eq. (10) with
S = 2, and averaging over all possible R positions in Eq. (8) to reflect the independence of
the popularity-rankings for R and R, we obtain:
D2 = Max
[
N2
3Rmax
(
1− R−2max
)
, N
(
1−
N
Rmax
)]
. (11)
The ‘Max’ operation ensures that as Rmax increases and hence {nR} → 0, 1, Eq. (9) is
still satisfied [4]. Equation (11) underestimates D2 at small Rmax (see Fig. 1) since it
assumes that the rankings of R and R are unrelated, thereby overestimating the Crowd-
Anticrowd cancellation. By contrast, an overestimate of D2 at small Rmax can be obtained
by considering the opposite limit whereby Ψ is sufficiently uniform that the popularity and
strategy-performance rankings are identical. Hence the strategy with popularity-ranking X
in Eq. (10) is anticorrelated to the strategy with popularity-ranking Rmax + 1 − X . This
leads to a slightly modified first expression in Eq. (11): 2N
2
3Rmax
(1 − R−2max). Figure 1 shows
that the resulting analytical expressions reproduce the quantitative trends in the standard
deviation D
1/2
2 observed numerically for all N and Rmax, and they describe the wide spread
in the numerical data observed at small Rmax.
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In summary, we have uncovered an explicit connection between multi-agent games and
conventional many-body theory. This should not only help to bring multi-agent games
closer to the Physics community, but it should also help the Physics community step into
non-traditional areas of research where multi-agent simulations are now being actively used.
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FIG. 1: (Color online) Results for the standard deviation of fluctuations D
1/2
2 in the Minority
Game. Numerical results correspond to 20 different runs at each N and Rmax. The theoretical
curves are generated using the analytic expressions in the text. The shaded area bounded by the
upper and lower curves shows our theoretical prediction of the numerical spread for a given N . In
line with the original numerical results of Ref. [6], we have chosen successive Rmax tick-values to
increase by a factor of 4.
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FIG. 2: Diagrammatic equivalent (schematic) of some simple pth order moments DP of the multi-
agent output variable D(t). Top: p = 1 is the mean D1. Bottom: p = 2 is the variance D2. Also
shown is an approximate expansion forD2 as represented by Eq. (8). Higher-order terms, which are
neglected in Eq. (8), would correspond to residual correlations between distinct Crowd-Anticrowd
quasiparticles.
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